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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past several years, restrictions imposed by states, cities,
and municipalities on smoking in public areas have survived court chal-
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lenges and become almost commonplace.' Likewise, both public and
private employers have limited smoking in the workplace.2 A further
restriction that seems to be emerging, however, is a refusal by both the
state and a growing number of private employers to hire or to continue
to employ smokers.3 These restrictions limit the employee's freedom to
smoke not only in the workplace, but also after working hours and
within the privacy of the worker's home.
This Note will address the constitutionality of such a restriction on
public employees. The analysis will be based on a recently passed Mas-
sachusetts statute that forbids policemen, firefighters, and certain other
public safety employees to smoke on or off the job. Part II describes the
Massachusetts statute and the reasons behind its passage. Part III dis-
cusses the health and economic costs of smoking to society, smokers,
employers, and those unwillingly exposed to smoke. Part IV addresses
the background of smoking restrictions in general, focusing on restric-
tions on smoking in the workplace. Part V analyzes the constitutional-
ity of smoking restrictions in light of the only court decision involving a
challenge to a similar restriction and considers other possible constitu-
tional arguments. Part VI considers other possible challenges to the
antismoking statute under federal and state statutes. Part VII discusses
the enforceability of the statute and possible constitutional challenges
against enforcement. Finally, Part VIII concludes that although the
statute probably is constitutional, there are serious practical and consti-
tutional problems with enforceability and a broader antismoking re-
striction probably could be challenged successfully.
II. THE MASSACHUSETTS STATUTE
In late 1987 the Massachusetts legislature passed and Governor
Michael Dukakis signed into law a statute preventing certain public
agencies such as the police and fire departments from hiring smokers
and dictating the termination of newly hired employees who later begin
to smoke.4 No court challenges to the restriction have been filed since
1. At least 40 states have passed laws prohibiting smoking in public areas. See infra notes
51-54 and accompanying text. Court challenges to such restrictions rarely have been successful.
See, e.g., Rossie v. State Dep't of Revenue, 133 Wis. 2d 341, 395 N.W.2d 801 (1986) (rejecting a
challenge to a state law imposing smoking restrictions in public buildings). But see Boreali v. Axel-
rod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 523 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1987) (holding that the New York Public
Health Council overstepped its authority when it promulgated smoking restrictions in public
buildings).
2. See infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 4-19 & 62 and accompanying text.
4. 1987 Mass. Acts 697, §§ 5, 6, 11, 117, 123 (codified in scattered sections of MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. chs. 22, 27, 36, 41 (West Supp. 1987). The largest group of public employees who will be
affected by the statute are undoubtedly policemen and firefighters. The portion of the statute that
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the statute became effective in October 1988, although the police union
has threatened to challenge its constitutionality. The legislation bans
smoking for municipal policemen and firefighters;6 metropolitan, trans-
portation authority, capitol, and public works building police;7 guards
and supervisors for prisoners, delinquents, and the criminally insane;8
and fire and crash control employees at Boston's Logan Airport." In the
same package the legislature instituted a "wellness program" for public
employees;1 "smoking cessation" is a primary goal of the program."
Another stated goal of the program is to decrease the mortality and
morbidity rates among the general public from accidents and diseases
for which risk factors can be identified. 12 These risk factors specifically
include smoking. Under the smoking prohibition, current public safety
employees who smoke may continue to do so without penalty, although
presumably the newly instituted wellness program will encourage them
to quit.
The Massachusetts statute is the first smoking ban instituted on a
state-wide level,'" although several municipalities have passed similar
restrictions. 4 The statute was passed as a compromise in a dispute be-
applies to the state police reads:
Subsequent to January first, nineteen hundred and eighty-eight, no person who smokes
any tobacco product shall be eligible for appointment as a uniformed member of the division
of state police, and no person so appointed after said date shall continue in such office or
position if such person thereafter smokes any tobacco product; the personnel administrator
shall promulgate regulations for the implementation of the provisions of this sentence.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22, § 9A (West Supp. 1987).
5. Fox, Smoking in the Workplace: Who Has What Rights?, 11 CAMPBELL L. REV. 311, 316-
32 (1989) (citing Police Union Plans Challenge of Smoking Ban, Boston Globe (Metro), Oct. 7,
1988, at 33); Conversation with Jane Schacter, Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts (Feb. 20, 1989).
6. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 101A (West Supp. 1987).
7. Id. ch. 36, § 64.
8. Id. ch. 27, § 2.
9. Id. ch. 73, § 3B (West Supp. 1989).
10. Id. ch. 111, § 206 (West Supp. 1987).
11. Id. The statute specifies that the wellness program be implemented first for policemen
and firefighters to enable them to meet the initial health and fitness hiring standards established
by statute. Id. ch. 31, § 61A. The legislature authorized the initial health and fitness standards for
newly hired policemen and firefighters and further allowed the establishment of stricter standards
through collective bargaining if such standards are rationally related to the duties of the positions
and have the goal of minimizing health and safety risks. Id. A specific wellness program for police-
men and firefighters, which does not mention smoking, was established in id. § 61B.
12. Id.
13. See Gold, Police and Fire Depts. Face Massachusetts Smoking Ban, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2,
1988, at 20, col. 1 (quoting Steve Weiss, New York Spokesman, Philip Morris U.S.A.).
14. Municipal police and fire departments that refuse to hire smokers include Alexandria,
Arlington, and Fairfax Counties, Virginia; and Manteca, California. The fire departments in Janes-
ville, Wisconsin; Midwest City, Norman, and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Salem, Oregon; Shaker
Heights, Ohio; and Wichita, Kansas similarly reject smokers. See BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS,
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tween the State's municipalities and public safety employee unions.15
Massachusetts, along with a majority of states, 6 has enacted a statutory
presumption that a disease of the lungs or respiratory tract which re-
sults in total disability or death to a firefighter is job-related and enti-
tles the sufferer to job-related disability benefits, unless the contrary
can be shown by competent evidence.17 The State wished to restrict or
eliminate this presumption to avoid paying expensive job-related disa-
bility benefits to firefighters who suffered lung disease through smoking
rather than on the job, while the union sought to retain the presump-
tion for the benefit of members. 8 The two parties reached a compro-
mise, retaining the presumption, but prohibiting any new hiring of
smokers. The tobacco industry opposed the Massachusetts smoking
ban, but declined to lobby against its passage because of the decision to
retain the statutory presumption.' 9
III. THE COSTS OF SMOKING
A. Health Consequences
Doubts about the adverse health consequences of tobacco began as
early as 1761.20 The majority of the scientific community, including the
Surgeon General, now accepts the conclusion that smoking is harmful
to both the smoker and to those forced to breathe air containing smoke.
One need only look to the various Surgeon General's Warnings im-
printed by law on every cigarette package and advertisement,21 and to
(1987) [hereinafter WHERE THERE'S SMOKE]; see also Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816
F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987) (upholding a challenge to an Oklahoma City ordinance prohibiting
trainee firefighters from smoking on or off the job).
15. See Gold, supra note 13.
16. See Rothstein, Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?,
62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 940, 952 & n.113 (1987).
17. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 94A (West Supp. 1987). A challenge to the antismoking
statute in regard to firefighters might argue that the provision providing for rebuttal of the pre-
sumption on competent evidence is sufficient to prevent the payment of unjustified disability ben-
efits without the institution of a broad antismoking provision, especially if the presumption statute
were amended to shift the burden of proof back to the disabled employee once a smoking habit
were established. See infra text accompanying note 221.
18. See Gold, supra note 13.
19. See id. (quoting' Dennis M. Dyer, Regional Vice President, Tobacco Institute (a trade
association for the tobacco industry)).
20. Davis, Tobacco Use and Associated Health Risks, in TOBACCO SMOKING AND NICOTINE. A
NEUROBmOLOGIcAL APPROACH 15 (W. Martin ed. 1987) [hereinafter NEUROBIOLOGICAL APPROACH]
(citing studies in 1761 and 1789 on the health risks of tobacco).
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988). The Surgeon General's Warnings read:
(1) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema,
And May Complicate Pregnancy.
(2) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks To
Your Health.
[Vol. 43:491494
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the numerous scientific studies on the matter to see that this conclusion
is inescapable.22 The Surgeon General in a 1979 Report concluded that
"cigarette smoking is the single most important preventable environ-
mental factor contributing to illness, disability, and death in the United
States. 23 Smoking has been linked to lung, respiratory, and other can-
cer; chronic obstructive lung disease; various cardiovascular problems
including heart attacks; and low birth weight and premature births.24
The habit contributes to thirty-two percent of all cancer deaths, thir-
teen percent of cardiovascular deaths, and eighty-eight percent of
deaths attributed to chronic obstructive lung disease.25 Smoking is esti-
mated to cause or contribute to over three hundred thousand deaths
each year in the United States, or fifteen percent of the total mortal-
ity." A group of one hundred young smokers will lose one of their num-
ber to murder, two to automobile accidents, and twenty-five to the
effects of smoking.2 The most recent report of the Surgeon General
warns that tobacco is as equally addictive as heroin or cocaine.2"
The adverse health consequences of smoking are not limited to
smokers alone, but appear also in those exposed to passive or environ-
mental tobacco smoke (ETS) from coworkers, parents, or other smokers
present in public areas. The Surgeon General has concluded that invol-
untary exposure to smoke may cause disease, including lung cancer, in
nonsmokers and states further that simple separation of smokers and
nonsmokers within the same environment may reduce, but will not
eliminate entirely the hazards of exposure.29 One expert estimates that
the risk of lung cancer in nonsmokers exposed to ETS is between 1.3
(3) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury,
Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
(4) SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.
Id.
22. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION (1988) [hereinafter NICOTINE ADDICTION];
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING (1986) [hereinafter INVOLUNTARY SMOKING]; REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GEN., U.S. DEP' OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER AND
CHRONIC LUNG DISEASE IN THE WORKPLACE (1985).
23. G. OSTER, G. COLDITZ & N. KELLY, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF SMOKING AND BENEFITS OF
QUITrING 4 (1984) [hereinafter ECONOMIC COSTS] (quoting REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING (1979)).
24. See INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 22, at 6.
25. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, STAFF MEMO, SMOKING-RELATED
DEATHS AND FINANCIAL COSTS 1-3, 43 (1985) [hereinafter FINANCIAL COSTS].
26. INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 22, at ix.
27. See Rothstein, supra note 16, at 941-42.
28. See NICOTINE ADDICTION, supra note 22, at 9.
29. See INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 22, at 7.
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and 3.5 times the risk faced by those who escape exposure.3 0 Although
lung cancer is the most serious health consequence of exposure to ETS,
other possible effects include acute and chronic respiratory disease, and
irritations to the eyes, nose, and throat. 1 Between five hundred and
five thousand nonsmokers are thought to die each year from exposure
to passive smoke.32 Despite these statistics, some scientists still ques-
tion the evidence and statistical evaluations of the harmful effects of
smoking and secondhand smoke."3
B. Economic Costs
The economic costs of smoking are high for the smoker, the em-
ployer, and society. Men under forty-five who smoke over two packs of
cigarettes a day face more than 56,000 dollars of additional illness costs
over their lifetimes, not including amounts spent to purchase ciga-
rettes.3 4 The Office of Technology Assessment places the societal costs
of health problems associated with smoking in 1985 at 65 billion dol-
lars.3 5 One expert estimates that each smoking employee costs an em-
ployer over 1000 dollars each year through higher absentee rates, lower
productivity attributed to smoking rituals,36 and higher health, fire, and
life insurance costs.3 7 The highest estimate places the cost of smoking
to employers at 4500 dollars per year for each smoking employee: 220
dollars for the 2.2 extra days of absence each smoker will take; 995 dol-
lars for reduction in morbidity and premature mortality; 995 dollars for
30. WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 14, at 5 (quoting Steven D. Stellman, Ph.D., Assis-
tant Vice President of Epidemiology, American Cancer Society).
31. See id. at 4-5. A link between involuntary ETS exposure and cardiovascular disease has
not been established by conclusive evidence. Id.
32. See id. at 5.
33. See Aviado, Health Issues Relating to "Passive" Smoking, in SMOKING AND SOCITY: To-
WARD A MORE BALANCED AsSESSMENT 158 (R. Tollison ed. 1986) (finding "no substantial evidence
to support the view that exposure to environmental tobacco smoke presents a significant health
hazard to the nonsmoker"); Eysenck, Smoking and Health, in SMOKING AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A
MORE BALANCED AsSESSMENT, supra, at 21 (stating that even if smoking were a cause of cancer, it
is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause); WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 14, at 5-6 (quoting
a George Washington University clinical professor of medicine's testimony to Congress that the
claims of hazards from secondhand smoke are "scientifically unsupportable" (sic)); see also R.
TOLLISON & R. WAGNER, SMOKING AND THE STATE: SOCIAL CosTs, RENT SEEKING, AND PUBLIC POLICY
19-22 (1988) (questioning the statistical applications of smoking studies).
34. ECONOMIC CosTs, supra note 23, at xvii.
35. See FINANCIAL CosTs, supra note 25, at 55.
36. Note, No Butts About It: Smokers Must Pay for Their Pleasure, 12 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L.
317, 323 (1987). A smoking "ritual" is the act of lighting and smoking a cigarette--"lighting, puf-
fing, and staring." Id.
37. See WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 14, at 7. The total annual cost to a business per
smoker has been estimated at $336-$601: $75-$150 in health care costs, $80-$166 in productivity
losses (estimating one minute lost in each working hour for "smoking rituals"), and $40-$80 in
higher absenteeism, as well as other costs. Id.
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other extra insurance costs; 1820 dollars for productivity lost to smok-
ing rituals; 500 dollars for damage and depreciation caused by smoke;
500 dollars for extra maintenance costs; and 485 dollars for injuries to
nonsmoking employees.38 Furthermore, employers who fail to protect
nonsmoking employees from exposure to passive smoke may face ex-
pensive court judgments and settlements in jurisdictions that impose a
duty on the employer to provide a smoke-free environment.39 One cost
of smoking to the employer that is particularly relevant to the off-duty
smoking prohibition is the deleterious effect of regular smoking on the
employee's general physical condition, fitness, and ability to perform
strenuous activities without shortness of breath. 0
Advocates and advisors for the tobacco industry, however, have
questioned these statistics. They contend that workplace smoking con-
trol measures will raise costs by requiring smokers to leave their work-
sites and suspend production while smoking.41 Likewise, some statistics
show that nonsmokers are absent from work more often than smokers.4 2
The loss of on-the-job productivity by smokers is also the subject of
dispute, with some smokers and supervisors noticing no loss of produc-
tivity.43 Some research even suggests that smoking increases mental ef-
ficiency and improves mental performance.44 Most importantly, some
experts claim that a refusal to hire smokers will lead to a substantial
and costly reduction in the pool of employable persons, especially in
light of the shrinking workforce. 5
38. See Daynard, Smoke Gets in Your Bottom Line, 5 BOSTON Bus. J. 3 (1985).
39. See, e.g., Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div.
1976) (establishing a duty to provide a smoke-free environment); Silver, Lawyer Warns Companies
of Non-Smokers' Rights, Hartford Courant, Apr. 12, 1987, at A18.
40. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. A policeman or firefighter who is a regular
smoker on off-duty time almost certainly will be less fit to engage in strenuous activities like fight-
ing fires or pursuing suspects than his or her counterpart who never smokes.
41. See WHERE THERE'S SMoKE, supra note 14, at 7. Robert D. Tollison of the Center for
Public Choice at George Mason University estimates these costs at $309.5 million per year or $867
per smoking employee. Id.
42. See id.; see also R ToLLisoN & R. WAGNER, supra note 33, at 26-27 (suggesting that men
who currently smoke fewer than 15 cigarettes per day miss less work than men who formerly
smoked, and that women who currently smoke up to a pack of cigarettes a day miss less work than
women who formerly smoked).
43. See WHERE THERE'S SMoKE, supra note 14, at 7-8 (citing a self-survey of bank executives
in which smokers claimed to use their time 2.5% more efficiently than nonsmokers, and a survey of
supervisors in which 66% claimed no decline in performance among smokers).
44. See Wesnes, Nicotine Increases Mental Efficiency: But How?, in NEUROBIOLOGICAL AP-
PROACH, supra note 20, at 63.
45. See Gold, supra note 13 (quoting Dennis Dyer, Regional Vice President, Tobacco Insti-
tute (a trade association for the tobacco industry)).
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IV. BACKGROUND OF SMOKING RESTRICTIONS
A. Legislative Response
Restrictions on smoking began early; tobacco use was a capital of-
fense in fifteenth-century Turkey.46 Early American legislative smoking
bans were based on the perceived social evils and physical maladies
caused by cigarettes and were supported by a moral crusade resembling
the Prohibition crusade against alcohol.41 In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries twelve states banned cigarettes entirely, but
all of these bans were repealed by 1927."1 Early workplace smoking re-
strictions were limited to industries such as mining in which the pres-
ence of explosives or a similar factor made smoking a direct health
hazard.4"
By the 1960s and 1970s, the growing awareness of the health costs
of smoking led to the development of new antismoking legislation, in-
cluding restrictions on private and public smoking in the workplace, on
the federal, state, and local levelY° One organization estimates that over
400 laws and ordinances nationwide restrict smoking.5 1 By 1986 over
forty states and many cities and municipalities had enacted laws re-
stricting smoking to some degree."2 Some of these states limit the re-
striction to a few public areas, 5 but others impose sweeping restrictions
that apply even to the workplace of the private employer.5 4 Twenty-two
states limit workplace smoking for public employees.55 Some of these
laws merely require employers to adopt a smoking policy, while others
mandate specific nonsmoking areas or restrict smoking to private of-
46. See Davis, supra note 20, at 15.
47. See INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 22, at 267.
48. Id. Interestingly, one of the first states to ban tobacco use entirely was Tennessee, in
1887. Id. Tennessee is a leading tobacco growing state and today remains one of the few states with
no smoking restrictions whatsoever. Id. at 268.
49. For instance, the Mine Health and Safety Act restricts smoking in mines. See 30 U.S.C. §
820(g) (1982).
50. See INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 22, at 267.
51. WHERE THERE'S SMoKE, supra note 14, at 39.
52. See id. at xi.
53. See id. at 266-67. For a map showing the extent and severity of smoking restrictions in
the United States, see Stroud, When Two "Rights" Make a Wrong: The Protection of Non-
smokers' Rights in the Workplace, 11 CAMPBELL L. REV. 339, 358-59 n.132 (1989). This map shows
the clear connection between the importance of tobacco to a state's economy and the extent to
which the state regulates smoking. Id.; see also supra note 48.
54. Thirteen states now regulate smoking in the private workplace. See Fox & Davison,
Smoking in the Workplace: Accommodating Diversity, 25 CAL. W.L. REV. 215, 228-30 (1989); see
also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-40Q (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.411-.417 (West
1989). But see Fox, supra note 5, at 332 (describing attempts in Virginia and several other states
to pass legislation prohibiting employment discrimination against smokers).
55. See INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 22, at 270.
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fices. None bans smoking from the workplace entirely. 6 The federal
government also has limited smoking in certain areas, such as on do-
mestic airline flights57 and in the federal workplace. Both the Army5"
and the General Services Administration (GSA)59 have instituted bans.
The GSA ban effectively will restrict smoking to private office space in
7500 federal buildings and applies to most federal civilian employees.60
The newest and most controversial type of legislative restriction on
smoking was passed recently in Massachusetts and a few municipalities:
a total ban on smoking for some public employees, either on or off the
job.6 This restriction goes further than any previous smoking ban in
forbidding employees to smoke not only in the workplace or on the em-
ployer's time, but also during off-duty hours or breaks while in public
or in the privacy of the employee's home. Limitations on smoking for
both public and private employees while in the workplace are now
widely accepted. The controversial aspect of the Massachusetts restric-
tion and similar legislation is the extent of the state's power to regulate
the off-duty activities of its employees. A challenge to restrictions that
ban smoking in the workplace most likely would fail in light of the cases
discussed below. Many possible challenges exist, however, to a restric-
tion on an employee's off-duty and private consumption of tobacco.
B. Private Restrictions
A growing percentage of private employers are instituting restric-
tions on smoking in the workplace. A recent survey found that thirty-
six percent of responding employers already had enacted smoking re-
strictions, with another twenty-three percent planning to adopt or con-
sidering a policy. 2 Reasons for the adoption of these policies include
state or local legislation requiring employers to adopt smoking policies,
employee health or comfort, and emploype complaints about smoke.6
Legislation was the single most cited impetus for the implementation of
nonsmoking policies; it was the sole motivation for twenty-three per-
56. For a general discussion of the parameters of private workplace legislation, see Fox &
Davison, supra note 54, at 228-30.
57. 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1374(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
58. See Army Bans Smoking at Work and in Its Vehicles or Aircrafts, N.Y. Times, June 12,
1986, at B12, col. 1.
59. 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.105-3(a)(1) (1988). The regulation allows agency heads to designate
nonsmoking areas to keep involuntary exposure to smoke to an "absolute minimum" "in recogni-
tion of the increased health hazards of passive smoke on the non-smoker" and prohibits smoking
altogether in certain areas, including general office space, classrooms, restrooms, corridors, and
libraries. Id. § 101-20.105-3(b).
60. Rothstein, supra note 16, at 950.
61. See supra notes 4-19 and accompanying text.
62. WHERE THERE'S SMoKe, supra note 14, at 1.
63. Id. at 2.
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cent of employers answering the survey. 4 Smokers provided opposition
to the policies in only ten percent of the firms, and very few employers
reported any noticeable effects on costs or productivity.6 5 The actual
policies range from a total ban on smoking in all workplace premises in
only six percent of responding companies, to a ban only if all employees
agree in three percent. The most widely used policy, adopted by forty-
one percent of the companies surveyed, prohibits smoking in all open
work areas.6 Half of the responding companies also had instituted pro-
grams designed to encourage and aid thei4 employees to quit smoking.6 7
Only twenty-three percent specifically set penalties for employees who
violated the rules.6 8
A few private employers, in an action analogous to the Massachu-
setts statute, refuse to employ smokers at all. Only one percent of the
organizations surveyed hire only nonsmokers, while five percent give
preference to nonsmokers.69 This Note does not address possible chal-
lenges to these policies, as private employers traditionally have wide
latitude in hiring criteria and the constitutional challenges available to
those challenging the hiring policies of public employers are not availa-
ble in this context because state action is necessary for a constitution-
ally based challenge. 0 Some of the statutory arguments discussed below
in respect to public off-duty smoking bans, however, also might be ap-
plied by private employees challenging similar bans.7 1
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 13-14.
67. Id. at 18.
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 17-18. For a complete list of companies that hire or give preference in hiring to
nonsmokers, see id. at 137. For a discussion of the factors employers should consider in drafting a
smoking policy, see Fox, supra note 5, at 334-37.
70. It is arguable that, because the state in its capacity as an employer is acting not as the
state but as a private party, the state also should not be subject to constitutional challenge for its
(mployment practices. A well-established line of cases now rejects this argument and establishes
that the state as employer constitutionally may not condition public employment on the interfer-
ence with a life, liberty, or property interest. See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 228-36 and accompanying text (discussing possible handicap and Title
VII challenges). See generally Fox & Davison, supra note 54, at 221-23; Rothstein, supra note 16,
at 956-60. Another factor that may either limit or cause the imposition of smoking policies in both
public and private workplaces is the presence of a union. Generally, employers seeking to adopt
smoking policies in a unionized workplace may not impose such policies without first bargaining
with the union representing affected employees. See, e.g., In re Parker Pen U.S.A., 90 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 489 (1987) (Fleischli, Arb.) (invalidating a smoking ban imposed without collective bargain-
ing); Fox & Davison, supra note 54, at 232-34; see also Haines, Key Concerns in Shaping a Com-
pany Smoking Policy, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 223 (1988) (outlining several key arbitration
decisions on smoking rules and offering guidance for employers seeking to set a reasonable policy).
These concerns are beyond the scope of this Note and will not be discussed further.
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C. Judicial Background
1. The Common-Law Duty to Provide a Smoke-Free Workplace
One line of cases holds that an employer may have a common-law
duty to provide a smoke-free environment to protect the safety and
comfort of nonsmoking employees.72 These cases, though not directly
relevant to the ban imposed by the Massachusetts statute, provide indi-
rect support for the argument that a public employer constitutionally
can forbid its employees from smoking. The first case holding that an
employer has a common-law duty to provide a smoke-free workplace
was Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.73 The plaintiff in Shimp,
a secretary who was sensitive to cigarette smoke, sought an injunction
forcing her employer to restrict smoking in her work area. 4 The com-
pany had allowed other employees to smoke in the same area, which
had aggravated the plaintiff's allergy to smoke. The court took judicial
notice of the dangers of smoking and passive smoke7 5 and recognized
that individuals have a right to risk their own health by smoking, but
declined to extend that right to risk the health of the smokers' fellow
employees .7 The court finally found that the risk of certain individuals
being particularly sensitive to smoke was great enough that an em-
ployer should foresee the health consequences to such an individual and
provide a smoke-free environment." The Shimp court emphasized,
however, that individuals who wished to smoke on their own time
should be allowed to do so if their smoking did not intrude on the
rights of other employees. 8
72. See, e.g., Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (Ch. Div.
1976). But see Gordon v. Raven Sys. & Research, Inc., 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983).
73. Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 516, 368 A.2d at 408; see also Smith v. Western Elec. Co. 643
S.W.2d 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (issuing an injunction banning workplace smoking and finding a
common-law duty to provide a smoke-free workplace for an employee who suffered a severe aller-
gic reaction to cigarette smoke).
74. Shimp, 145 N.J. Super. at 520, 368 A.2d at 409.
75. Id. at 527, 368 A.2d at 414 (stating that these dangers were "generally accepted by man-
kind as true and . . . capable of ready demonstration by means commonly recognized as
authoritative").
76. Id. at 530, 368 A.2d at 415. The court stated:
The evidence is clear and overwhelming. Cigarette smoke contaminates and pollutes the air,
creating a health hazard not merely to the smoker but to all those around her who must rely
upon the same air supply. The right of an individual to risk his or her own health does not
include the right to jeopardize the health of those who must remain around him or her in
order to properly perform the duties of their jobs.
Id.
77. Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 415-16.
78. The Shimp court stated:
In determining the extent to which smoking must be restricted the rights and interests of
smoking and nonsmoking employees alike must be considered. . . . The employee who
desires to smoke on his own time, during coffee breaks and lunch hours, should have a rea-
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At least one court has extended Shimp's reasoning to allow an ac-
tion for damages against an employer whose negligence in forcing an
employee to work in a smoky environment proximately caused injury to
the employee. In McCarthy v. Department of Social & Health Ser-
viceS7 9 the Washington Supreme Court accepted the Shimp view of a
common-law duty to provide a smoke-free environment in the work-
place and allowed an employee to pursue an action for negligence
against an employer whose failure to provide such an environment had
caused her lung disease.8s The court relied on the scientific literature on
the dangers of smoking and the well-established common-law duty to
provide employees with a reasonably safe workplace to find that a rea-
sonably safe workplace means a workplace free of smoke."' Only em-
ployers who knew or reasonably should have known of the dangers of
cigarette smoke have this duty, and the protesting employee has the
burden of establishing the employer's knowledge. Likewise, reasonable-
ness will be judged only on the sensitivities of a typical employee, not
one who is especially sensitive to smoke.2
Other courts, however, have rejected the Shimp court's reasoning,
holding that employers do not have an affirmative duty to provide a
smoke-free workplace. A District of Columbia court in Gordon v. Raven
Systems & Research, Inc. s found that the common-law duty to provide
a reasonably safe workplace does not include a duty to cater to the sen-
sitivities of an employee who is particularly susceptible to smoke. The
employee in Raven informed her employer of her sensitivity to tobacco
smoke when she was hired. The employer placed her apart from her
work group in an area with other nonsmokers to accommodate this sen-
sitivity, but notified her that she would have to rejoin the work group,
which contained one smoker, after the company discovered that the ex-
isting policy impaired operational efficiency."4 After the employee re-
fused to work in an area containing smokers, the company obtained the
agreement of the smoking member of the work group not to smoke
sonably accessible area in which to smoke.
Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416 (emphasis added).
79. 110 Wash. 2d 812, 759 P.2d 351 (1988).
80. Id. Ms. McCarthy, who had been employed by the defendant for 10 years, was continu-
ously exposed to smoke throughout her employment despite her complaints to her employer. She
claimed that because of this exposure to smoke, she developed a chronic pulmonary obstructive
condition, which eventually led to complete disability and termination of her employment. Id. at
814, 759 P.2d at 352.
81. Id. at 818-22, 759 P.2d at 354-56.
82. Id. at 821, 759 P.2d at 356. The employer must make a reasonable effort to accommodate
the sensitive employee if the employer is aware of the special sensitivity. Id. The employer is not,
however, bound to provide a smoke-free environment regardless of cost. Id. at 822, 759 P.2d at 356.
83. 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983).
84. Id. at 11.
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when the plaintiff was present.8 5 The work space, however, adjoined an
office in which another smoker was stationed, and cigarette smoke
reached the plaintiff and caused headaches, nausea, and eye irritation.8 6
The plaintiff notified her employers of the situation and moved back to
her original work station among the nonsmokers. After receiving a
warning, the plaintiff was terminated for refusal to remain in her as-
signed work station.8 7
The Raven court based its holding on cases refusing to limit the
right to smoke on constitutional grounds8" and cases holding specifically
that no constitutional right to a healthy environment exists. 9 The court
found that the issue of a healthy environment is better left to the legis-
lature than the courts." The court distinguished its holding from
Shimp, because the instant plaintiff, unlike the Shimp plaintiff, had
presented no evidence of the dangers of smoking in general, but simply
claimed that the employer owed a duty to her as a particularly sensitive
employee.9 The court declined to take judicial notice of the dangers of
smoking or to impose a duty to provide a smoke-free environment ab-
sent a specific showing of danger to all employees.92
In light of the cases holding that an employer actually may have a
duty to keep the workplace free of smoke, a constitutional challenge to
the Massachusetts statute or a similar statute based on a restriction on
smoking within the workplace or on the employer's time probably
would be unsuccessful. Not only may an employer protect other em-
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 11-12.
88. See infra notes 93-115 and accompanying text.
89. See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Tanner v. Armco Steel Co., 340 F. Supp. 532, 537
(S.D. Tex. 1972).
90. Raven, 462 A.2d at 14. The court stated:
[T]he judicial process ... is peculiarly ill-suited to solving problems of environmental con-
trol. Because such problems frequently call for the delicate balancing of competing social in-
terests, as well as the application of specialized expertise, it would appear that their
resolution is best consigned initially to the legislative and administrative processes. Further-
more, the inevitable trade-off between economic and ecological values presents a subject mat-
ter which is inherently political and which is far too serious to relegate to the ad hoc process
of "government by lawsuit"....
Id. (quoting Tanner, 340 F. Supp. at 536).
91. Id. at 15.
92. Id. Other nonsmoker challenges to smoking in the workplace have been based on various
statutory and common-law claims that are beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., Vickers v.
Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (holding that a nonsmoker who was hyper-
sensitive to smoke was handicapped for the purposes of the federal Rehabilitation Act); Hentzel v.
Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982) (recognizing the common-law tort of
wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress for an employee fired because he
had complained about workplace smoking).
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ployees through a workplace smoking ban, it may have a positive com-
mon-law duty to institute such protection. This common-law duty
provides support for the conclusion that the state as an employer con-
stitutionally may restrict smoking on the job.
2. Constitutional Approaches
Nonsmokers and smokers have tried several different constitutional
challenges, both to forced exposure to smoke and to smoking restric-
tions. Nonsmokers have argued that unwilling exposure to smoke de-
prives them of life, liberty, and property without due process, invades
their right to privacy, chills first amendment speech rights, and consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment. Smokers, on the other hand, have
argued that smoking restrictions violate their rights to privacy, invade
their liberty and property interests without due process, and violate the
equal protection clause. Courts generally have been hostile to these con-
stitutional arguments, both from smokers and nonsmokers.
Courts consistently have refused to recognize a constitutional right
to breathe air free of tobacco smoke. The decision in Gasper v. Louisi-
ana Stadium & Exposition District" was one of the first to consider
and reject constitutional arguments by nonsmokers. The plaintiffs in
Gasper asked the court to enjoin smoking in the Louisiana Superdome
during scheduled events, 4 arguing that the Dome's policy of allowing
smoking during events that they had attended or planned to attend vio-
lated the first, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments.9 5 The plain-
tiffs' first amendment claim rested on the alleged chilling effect of
smoking in the Superdome; because they must breathe harmful air as a
precondition to attendance at events in the Dome, they were less likely
to attend these events, and their first amendment right freely to receive
the thoughts and ideas of others was violated.9" The court rejected this
argument, stating that allowing smoking in the stadium was no more a
violation of first amendment rights than charging admission for the
events or allowing the selling of beer.97 Because the permissive attitude
93. 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978).
94. Id. at 716. The Dome was owned and operated by a political subdivision of the State of
Louisiana. Id.
95. Id. at 717. The court declined to decide the issue of whether the necessary state action
for the plaintiffs' claim existed because it found no validity in the constitutional claims. The plain-
tiffs had filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), alleging a constitutional violation by a person acting
under color of state law.
96. Id. at 717-18. The plaintiffs argued that the right to receive the thoughts and ideas of
others was peripheral to the first amendment right of free expression.
97. Id. at 718. The court stated:
To say that allowing smoking in the Louisiana Superdome creates a chilling effect upon
the exercise of one's First Amendment rights has no more merit than an argument alleging
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toward smoking protected sufficiently the delicate balance of individual
rights without intervening in purely private affairs, no first amendment
violation existed. 8
The plaintiffs also argued that the state, by allowing other patrons
to smoke in the Superdome and involuntarily exposing nonsmokers to
smoke, was depriving nonsmoking patrons of life, liberty, and property
without due process of law.9 They relied on Pollak v. Public Utilities
Commission'"0 to assert a violation of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. The court distinguished the instant case from Pollak and stated
that the balancing process necessary to determine an individual's right
to be left alone is the province of the legislative rather than the judicial
branch.' 01 Relying on Tanner v. Armco Steel Co., 102 a case in which the
court rejected the plaintiffs' damage suit for injuries sustained as a re-
sult of pollutants emitted by the defendant's refineries, the court in
Gasper specifically found that there was no constitutional right to a
clean environment under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.'03 The
court emphasized that the Constitution permits some social and eco-
nomic ills to go unremedied'0° and refused to provide another means by
which an individual could resort to the courts to police the social habits
of others.
The Gasper plaintiffs' final constitutional argument was based on
the right to privacy derived from the ninth amendment and developed
in Griswold v. Connecticut.0 5 They contended that the right to be free
of the hazards of smoke was equally as fundamental as the right to pri-
vacy within the marital relationship recognized in Griswold.'6 The
that admission fees charged at such events have a chilling effect upon the exercise of such
rights, or that the selling of beer violates First Amendment rights of those who refuse to
attend events where alcoholic beverages are sold.
Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 718.
100. 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951), rev'd, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). Pollak concerned the continual
programming of a radio broadcast on streetcars. The D.C. Circuit found that forcing the riders to
listen to broadcasts against their will violated the fifth amendment interest in liberty. The Su-
preme Court reversed, stating that "[tihe liberty of each individual in a public vehicle or public
place is subject to reasonable limitations in relation to the rights of others." Public Utils. Comm'n
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 465 (1952). The court in Gasper found that even if it accepted the appel-
late court's interpretation, the facts were distinguishable because the audience in Gasper, unlike
the streetcar riders in Pollak, were not a captive audience but instead chose to attend Dome
events. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 720.
101. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 720.
102. 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
103. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 720-21.
104. Id. at 721.
105. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
106. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 721.
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court disagreed, stating that to hold that the right to privacy extends to
the right to a smoke-free environment would mock the noble purposes
of the first, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments."'
Gasper involved constitutional arguments raised by nonsmokers
exposed to smoke in a public place. Courts also have refused to accept
constitutional claims against public employers raised by those unwill-
ingly exposed to smoke in the workplace, although courts will stop
workplace smoking under the common-law claims discussed above. 10 8 In
Federal Employees for Non-Smokers Rights (FENSR) v. United
States'0 9 the court rejected claims of first and fifth amendment viola-
tions brought by nonsmoking federal employees seeking to restrict
smoking in federal buildings. The plaintiffs contended that exposure to
smoke in the workplace violated their first amendment right to petition
the government for redress of grievances and that they had been de-
prived of life, liberty, and property without due process." 0 The court
found that the facts were indistinguishable from Gasper and refused to
hear the constitutional claims, although it left open the possibility of a
common-law action based on the Shimp duty to provide a smoke-free
workplace."' It also stated that the legislature, not the court, was the
proper forum for the nonsmokers' concerns."'
The Tenth Circuit in Kensell v. Oklahoma"s also rejected first,
fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendment claims brought by a nonsmoker
seeking the elimination of smoking from the workplace. The plaintiff,
an employee of the State of Oklahoma, claimed that exposure to smoke
at work violated his first amendment rights by impairing his ability to
think, assaulted him, and deprived him of a property right in his job
because he was forced to choose between quitting or continued expo-
sure to smoke." 4 The court found no merit in these claims, stating that
the role of the federal judiciary was not to act as a superlegislature
promulgating social change under the pretense of protecting constitu-
tional rights." 5
The only constitutional claim by a nonsmoker that has met with
any success is a claim that involuntary exposure to smoke while in
prison is cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 72-92 and accompanying text.
109. 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978).
110. Id. at 183-84.
111. Id. at 185.
112. Id.
113. 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1983).
114. Id. at 1351.
115. Id.
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The court in Avery v. Powell"-' accepted an inmate's pro se complaint
that his exposure to environmental tobacco smoke while in prison con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment and was a denial of a liberty
interest without due process. The court reasoned that the evolving stan-
dards of decency in society provide the standards by which the condi-
tions of confinement must be judged under the eighth amendment and
found that the modern realization of the hazards of tobacco smoke
leads to the conclusion that involuntary exposure while in prison vio-
lates the standards of decency that define fair punishment.1 7 The court
also found that involuntary exposure to smoke threatened the plaintiff's
liberty interest in his own health. The decision by the authorities to
confine the plaintiff in a cell in which his health was threatened by
smoke was a deliberate decision not reasonably related to any proper
governmental interest and thus, deprived him of his liberty interest in
his health without due process.""
The Avery decision, which is a rare example of judicial acceptance
of a constitutional argument in a smoking context, provides further
support for the proposition that a successful challenge to that portion
of the Massachusetts statute that prohibits smoking while public em-
ployees are actually on duty is unlikely. Parts of the statute apply spe-
cifically to prison guards and policemen, who presumably are exposed
regularly to convicted criminals. Smoking by these public employees
while on the job might not only threaten the health and comfort of
other employees, but also may violate the constitutional rights of any
nonsmoking prisoners exposed to smoke.
Constitutional challenges brought by smokers to smoking restric-
tions have met with similar hostility from courts. For instance, the
court in Rossie v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue"9 rejected a state
employee's claims that the smoking restrictions instituted by the state
Department of Revenue (DOR) violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment and impaired the obligation of contract
under either the state or federal constitution. 20 The State of Wisconsin
116. 695 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.H. 1988). For a complete discussion of Avery, see Note, Constitu-
tional Law-Prisoners' Rights-Recognition That Involuntary Exposure to Environmental To-
bacco Smoke May Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Avery v. Powell, 11 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 363 (1989).
117. Id. at 636-40.
118. Id. at 640-41.
119. 133 Wis. 2d 341, 395 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1986).
120. Id. The court first rejected the employee's contention that the restrictions were "rules"
that had to be promulgated pursuant to statutory authority. On the contrary, the court found that
the restrictions did not affect private rights or interests and were concerned with the private work-
ings of the agency. They were, therefore, properly promulgated and reasonably related to a statute
giving the state the power to manage the employees of the agency and establish reasonable work
rules. Id. at 348-50, 395 N.W.2d at 804-05.
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had passed a Clean Indoor Air Act, forbidding smoking in any enclosed
area of a state building, but permitting the person in charge to desig-
nate smoking areas. 12 The DOR in response instituted a nonsmoking
policy, forbidding smoking in most areas of its buildings, including pri-
vate offices.122 The plaintiff, a pipe smoker who had been employed by
the DOR for eighteen years, sued for declaratory and injunctive relief
from disciplinary action under the directives. 123
The plaintiff first argued that the Clean Indoor Air Act provided
unequal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment be-
cause it prohibited him and other smokers employed at the DOR from
smoking, while allowing smoking in many other places. The court re-
viewed the law under a reasonable basis standard, stating that the stat-
ute had a presumption of validity that could only be overcome by a
showing that the classification made by the legislature was irrational or
arbitrary. The court considered whether any reasonable basis to justify
the classification existed, not whether some inequality resulted from the
classification."2 The court found that treating smokers in public build-
ings differently than smokers in other areas was not arbitrary or capri-
cious, but rather a rational distinction that presented no equal
protection problem. The court recognized that the legislature had heard
testimony on the risks of smoking and had banned smoking only in ar-
eas in which nonsmoking government employees and members of the
public could not easily avoid smoke. It emphasized that the statute did
not ban smoking in most private areas that nonsmokers could avoid
easily.12 5
The Rossie plaintiff's second constitutional argument rested on the
contract clause of both the federal and state constitutions. 126 A 1976
121. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.123(2)(10), (3), (4) (West 1988). This statute is similar to the
federal regulation forbidding smoking in federal buildings and allowing the agency head to desig-
nate smoking areas. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
122. Rossie, 133 Wis. 2d at 347-48, 395 N.W.2d at 804.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 353, 395 N.W.2d at 806. The court applied five tests:
(1) All classification must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) the classification must
be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only; (4) the law must apply equally to each member of the class; and (5) the
characteristics of each class should be so far different from those of other classes as to reason-
ably suggest the propriety of substantially different legislation.
Id. (quoting Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 18-19, 218 N.W.2d 734, 742 (1974)).
125. The court stated that "[the statute] prohibits smoking in many public places where
people must go, and does not prohibit it in many places where people need not go." Id. at 355-56,
395 N.W.2d at 807. This distinction between public and private places in the equal protection
context provides a possible argument for an equal protection challenge to the off-duty smoking
ban: the state prohibits public employees from smoking at home, but allows all other smokers to
smoke freely. See infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
126. Rossie, 133 Wis. 2d at 356, 395 N.W.2d at 807-08; see also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10; Wis.
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directive of the DOR had allowed the plaintiff to smoke at his desk. 127
He asserted that this directive was part of his implied contract of em-
ployment and that the state had impaired the DOR's obligation of con-
tract by passing the Clean Indoor Air Act. The court found that even if
Rossie had a contractual right to smoke within the privacy of his office,
the Act had not impaired that right. The Act left the DOR free to des-
ignate smoking areas in buildings under its control, and it could easily
have so designated Rossie's desk. The DOR's choice not to allow smok-
ing was not mandated by the Act and, thus, any impairment of contract
was the DOR's responsibility. 28
The off-duty smoking ban at issue in the Massachusetts statute ap-
plies only to newly hired employees, who obviously have no existing em-
ployment contracts to violate. Any future similar statutory ban,
however, which also applies to smokers already employed, might be suc-
cessfully challenged by an argument similar to Rossie's. The employee
could argue that smoking while off duty and at home is an implied part
of the employment contract, and the statute banning off-duty smoking
impairs that contractual obligation.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN OFF-DUTY SMOKING RESTRICTION.
A. Substantive Due Process Guarantees of Liberty and Privacy
1. General Background
The fifth and the fourteenth amendments to the Constitution guar-
antee that the state cannot deprive a citizen of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. 29 The state may, however, deprive an indi-
vidual of life, liberty, or property if it has a sufficiently important inter-
est that outweighs the importance of these constitutionally guaranteed
rights. If the right is fundamental, which generally means it is specifi-
cally listed in the Constitution, the state must have a compelling inter-
est to constitutionally restrict the right, and the means employed must
be the least restrictive possible.'30 If the right is not fundamental, the
state need only have a rational basis for the restriction, and the means
must be reasonably related to that basis.' 3' To determine the constitu-
tionality of a restriction, the court engages in a balancing process: does
CONST. art I, § 12.
127. Rossie, 133 Wis. 2d at 355, 395 N.W.2d at 807.
128. Id. at 356-67, 395 N.W.2d at 808.
129. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The fifth amendment states "[n]o person shall .. . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The fourteenth amendment
reads "nor shall the state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."
130. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
131. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
1990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the state interest in the restriction outweigh the individual interest in
autonomy under the appropriate standard?
The due process guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments also protect the individual's privacy interest, or "right to be let
alone."' 2 The right of privacy is not specifically listed in the Constitu-
tion, but is drawn from the penumbras of several of its provisions.
133
This right is the right of personal autonomy and freedom from state
interference in decisions and actions that should be purely private.1
3 4
The privacy right, like the rights of liberty and property, cannot be re-
stricted without due process of law and stems in part from the due pro-
cess guarantees. 3 5 Other constitutional sources for the right of privacy
include first amendment guarantees of freedom of expression and asso-
ciation,13 6 the third amendment guarantee of freedom from having
soldiers quartered in private homes,3 7 the fourth amendment freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure, 138 and the ninth amendment
guarantee that the naming of specific rights in the Constitution will not
abridge the other rights retained by the people.'3 9 The right of privacy,
like the other life, liberty, and property interests, may be abridged or
restricted by the state if the state has a sufficiently important reason.
40
Again, fundamental privacy interests require a compelling state interest
for invasion, while others require only a rational basis.' 4' Courts engage
in the same balancing process and have been reluctant to find privacy
interests fundamental; to date, only those interests relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and the rearing and
132. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 720 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577
F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978).
133. See generally Classen, Restricting the Right to Smoke in Public Areas: Whose Rights
Should Be Protected?, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 831, 833-40, (1987); Note, Public Emhloyees or Private
Citizens: The Off-Duty Sexual Activities of Police Officers and the Constitutional Right of Pri-
vacy, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 195, 197-206 (1984).
134. See Roe v. Wade, 419 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
135. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (stating that the right of privacy is im-
plicit within fourteenth amendment substantive guarantees that are "'fundamental' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty' ") (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); Roe,
410 U.S. at 152.
136. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967) (dictum); DeGregory v.
Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
137. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
138. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
139. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
140. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
141. In Roe v. Wade the state's interest in preventing abortions could not outweigh a wo-
man's fundamental privacy interest in her own body for the first two trimesters, but became suffi-
ciently compelling in the third trimester of pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-34. But see Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (plurality decision) (refusing to overrule Roe's
privacy analysis, but allowing increased state regulation of abortions).
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education of children rise to the level of fundamental privacy rights." 2
Although the Supreme Court previously has stated that the outer
limits of the privacy right have not yet been determined,'43 it recently
refused, in Bowers v. Hardwick,14 to extend the right of privacy to con-
sensual homosexual acts between adults within the privacy of the home.
The Bowers decision narrows the right of privacy considerably. After
Bowers, it seems unlikely that the courts will extend fundamental pri-
vacy right analysis to the right of an individual to smoke within the
privacy of the home and while off duty.
It is well established that the state cannot condition employment
on the requirement that the prospective employee give up a constitu-
tional right.14" The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has applied this
precept directly to policemen in Broderick v. Police Commissioner,146
stating in dictum that public employment may not be conditioned upon
the surrender of constitutional rights that could not be abridged di-
rectly by the state. 47 The government may use its police power to con-
dition public employment on the abridgement of constitutional rights,
however, so long as the state interest in the prohibition is either com-
pelling, in the case of a fundamental right,148 or rationally related to the
accomplishment of the state objective, if the right is not fundamen-
tal."19 Furthermore, the state has a much easier task in establishing a
sufficient interest to invade the rights of its employees than it does
when restricting a private citizen. The state regulation of a public em-
ployee carries a presumption of correctness, and the employee challeng-
ing the regulation has the burden of proof in establishing that it is not
rationally connected to the state end. 150
142. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
143. Id. at 684.
144. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
145. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Keyishian v. Regents of
the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967) (rejecting the premise that "public employment...
may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by
direct government action").
146. 368 Mass. 33, 330 N.E.2d 199, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1975).
147. Id. at 37, 330 N.E.2d at 202 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605).
148. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
554-56 (1973).
149. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1976). As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
stated, a police officer "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor & Aldermen, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(1892).
150. See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 245. The Court stated:
[W]e have sustained comprehensive and substantial restrictions upon activities of both fed-
eral and state employees lying at the core of the First Amendment .... [T]here is surely
even more room for restrictive regulations ... where the claim implicates only the more gen-
eral contours of the substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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A public employee challenging an off-duty smoking prohibition like
the Massachusetts statute could argue that the state has wrongfully
conditioned public employment on an agreement to give up the liberty
to smoke while off duty and has violated the substantive due process
guarantee of the fifth and fourteenth amendments by invading a liberty
and privacy interest without due process of law. The preliminary ques-
tion is whether smoking off duty is the kind of liberty or privacy that is
constitutionally protected at all. If such a right exists and is fundamen-
tal, the state must justify the invasion of liberty with a compelling state
interest and also must prove that the restriction is the least intrusive
means possible to achieve that end.151 If the right to smoke is less than
fundamental, the employee must prove that the state interest is not
rational, or that the restriction is not reasonably and rationally related
to that interest.15
2
2. The Grusendorf Decision
The court in Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 53 the only case
yet to examine an off-duty smoking restriction on a public employee,
held that the restriction was a reasonable exercise of the state's police
power and thus constitutional. Grusendorf involved a policy of the
Oklahoma City fire department forbidding trainee firefighters to smoke
at any time, on or off duty. The plaintiff, a trainee who had signed an
agreement not to smoke for one year as a condition to accepting em-
ployment with the department, had been fired when, after an especially
stressful day, he took three puffs of a cigarette while on an unpaid
lunch break.15 4 Grusendorf previously had applied for a firefighter posi-
tion and been denied. Subsequently, he studied firefighting manuals,
got himself into good physical condition, and quit smoking. 55 When
hired, he was fifth highest on a list of four hundred applicants. He
claimed that his constitutional rights of liberty, property, and privacy
had been violated without due process. 56 The Grusendorf court used a
four-step test to analyze the off-duty smoking ban: (1) was a liberty or
privacy interest violated?; (2) was this interest fundamental?; (3) if not,
did the state have a prima facie case establishing the rational basis of
Id.
151. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
153. 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
154. Id. at 540.
155. Id.
156. The court considered Grusendorfs privacy and liberty claims at length, but did not
consider the deprivation of property argument because oral argument had established that as a
trainee, Grusendorf's property interest in retaining his job was not sufficient to support his argu-
ment. Id. at 540 n.1.
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the interference with the liberty?; and (4) if so, did the plaintiff demon-
strate that the interference was arbitrary or irrational? 5
The preliminary question of whether the right to smoke while off
duty is a liberty that is constitutionally protected by the substantive
due process guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments is easily
answered in the affirmative. The Grusendorf court assumed without de-
ciding that the fourteenth amendment protected the liberty interest of
firefighter trainees in smoking when off duty. The city had argued that
because the privacy was not fundamental, no balancing test or rationale
of any kind was needed to justify the restriction,' but the court re-
jected this argument.15 9
Likewise, courts in previous smoking cases have implicitly consid-
ered that the right to smoke is protected to some degree, which requires
a balancing of the rights of smokers against nonsmokers. In Gasper v.
Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District,60 for instance, the court
termed its analysis of nonsmokers' due process claims as the process of
balancing an individual's right to be left alone against other individuals'
alleged rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.' 6' The right
to be left alone in Gasper is the right to be free of interference in the
choice to smoke. Gasper involved a situation in which others necessarily
were exposed to smoke. The right to be left alone in a choice to smoke
is much stronger when an individual chooses to smoke while off duty
and at home. Similarly, the court in Rossie v. Wisconsin Department of
1621 tscnRevenue, in its consideration of constitutional challenges by a non-
smoker to workplace smoking restrictions, drew a distinction between
the liberty to smoke at work and while off duty. 63 The existence of a
liberty interest in the right to smoke also follows from cases like Kelley
v. Johnson," which assumed without deciding that a police officer had
a liberty interest in the length of his hair,'65 and Hander v. San Jacinto
Junior College,66 which specifically held that an adult has a constitu-
tional right to wear his hair as he chooses.
157. Id. at 542-43.
158. Id. at 541.
159. The court stated that "[ilt can hardly be disputed that the [department's] non-smoking
regulation infringes upon the liberty and privacy of the firefighter trainees." Id.
160. 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978); see supra notes 93-
107 and accompanying text.
161. Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 720.
162. 133 Wis. 2d 341, 395 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1986).
163. The Rossie court stated that "[t]he smoking ban does not apply, in contrast, to areas
that nonsmokers may easily avoid, such as privately owned and occupied offices, [and] private
halls." Id. at 355, 395 N.W.2d at 807.
164. 425 U.S. 238 (1976); see infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
165. Kelley, 425 U.S. at 244.
166. 519 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1975); see infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
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The second issue, whether the right to smoke off duty is fundamen-
tal, is somewhat more problematic, although the Grusendorf court
seemed to reach its conclusion easily. The plaintiff in Grusendorf did
not argue that the right to smoke off duty was fundamental, and the
court held that the liberty was an ordinary rather than a fundamental
right.16 7 The court first rejected the state's contention that because the
right to smoke was not fundamental, no balancing test or rationale
whatsoever for the restriction was needed,' stating that the acceptance
of this rationale would free the state to condition employment arbitrar-
ily upon an agreement to refrain from many innocent, private, and per-
sonal activities.16 9
The court in Grusendorf was correct in deciding that the right to
smoke off duty is not fundamental. In light of Grusendorf, a plaintiff
challenging the Massachusetts or a similar statute would find it difficult
or impossible to argue that the right to smoke is fundamental. Further-
more, the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick70 shows its
hostility to extending the list of fundamental rights.'7
Therefore, any substantive due process argument against a smok-
ing restriction statute must allege that the statute is not rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state objective. The Grusendorf court found,
however, that the state has a heightened interest in regulating its em-
ployees simply by virtue of being their employer and may apply com-
prehensive and substantial restrictions upon the freedoms of state
employees that go beyond the restrictions imposed on other citizens.172
The court extended a presumption of validity to the regulation in
question. 73
The court first found that the off-duty smoking prohibition was
reasonably related to a legitimate purpose. The court apparently took
judicial notice of the dangers of smoking to find a legitimate purpose
for the regulation, noting that the Surgeon General's Warning on the
167. Grusendorf, 816 F.2d at 541.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 542.
170. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see also Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F.
Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976) (holding that the right to breathe air free of tobacco smoke was not a
fundamental privacy right), af'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978); supra notes 105-07 and accompany-
ing text.
171. The Bowers Court stated:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new funda-
mental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
172. Grusendorf, 816 F.2d at 542.
173. Id. at 543; see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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side of every box of cigarettes evidenced a legitimate purpose and ra-
tional connection. 7 4 The court also took notice of the fact that good
health and physical fitness are vital for firefighters, and that firefighters
who are frequently exposed to smoke inhalation might be rendered
more susceptible to physical damage if their lungs were already dam-
aged by smoking. 75 From these bases, the court concluded that a prima
facie case for the rationality of the regulation had been established. The
burden to defeat this prima facie rationality shifted to the plaintiff,
who failed to demonstrate that the regulation was irrational and arbi-
trary. 17 6 The regulation was, therefore, constitutional.
3. Other Off-Duty Restrictions
Although only Grusendorf has addressed the state's power to regu-
late off-duty smoking, a survey of decisions on the state's power to re-
strict other types of off-duty activities of its employees is helpful in this
analysis. Challenges to state interference in the private, off-duty con-
duct of public employees have focused on three areas: personal appear-
ance, political activities, and private sexual conduct.
Restrictions on personal appearance have been upheld for police
and firefighters, though not in other contexts. The Grusendorf court's
opinion relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Kelley v.
Johnson.7 7 Kelley involved a challenge by a policeman to regulations
established by the Suffolk County, New York, Police Department
prohibiting beards and governing the length of male police officers' hair,
sideburns, and mustaches. 78 The plaintiff challenged the regulation on
both first and fourteenth amendment grounds, stating that it violated
his right of free expression and deprived him of the liberty to wear his
hair as he wished without due process. 17 9 The Court assumed the exis-
tence of a liberty interest in personal appearance, but distinguished
that right from the fundamental rights protected in Griswold and
Roe. s0 It found that the hair-length regulation was a legitimate exercise
of police power, as the state has substantial leeway in its control of
state employees. The Court emphasized that just as the police depart-
ment could require employees to wear a uniform, salute the flag, refrain
174. Grusendorf, 816 F.2d at 543.
175. Id. The statutory presumption of job-related disability and the Massachusetts response
show a similar concern that smoking might increase the risk of damage from smoke inhalation, and
that the state might be forced to pay disability benefits to smokers who have damaged their own
lungs. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
176. Grusendorf, 816 F.2d at 543.
177. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
178. Id. at 239-40.
179. Id. at 240-41.
180. Id. at 244.
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from politically partisan activities, and refrain from smoking in pub-
lic,'8 ' so the department could dictate how its employees should wear
their hair. Such a restriction could be rationally based on either a need
for police to be easily identifiable by the public or a desire to foster an
esprit de corps within the department.'82
Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College'8 3 was decided on facts simi-
lar to Kelley, but came to an entirely different conclusion. In Hander,
which the plaintiff relied on heavily in Grusendorf,184 the plaintiff was a
junior college teacher who had been discharged for failing to follow a
policy requiring all faculty members to be clean-shaven, keep reasona-
bly short hair, and have no excessively long sideburns.8 5 The plaintiff
based his suit on claims of due process and equal protection and did
not argue a violation of privacy or freedom of expression. 8 The court
found no legitimate educational justification for the restrictions and
held them unconstitutional. It distinguished the facts from cases like
Kelley, stating that the college, unlike the police department, has no
need to maintain the public's confidence in sensitive and highly visible
employees.87
Restrictions on political activities also have been found constitu-
tional for police, although not for some other public employees. 88 The
Eighth Circuit in Reeder v. Kansas City Board of Police Commission-
ers18 9 upheld the discharge of a police officer for violating a state law
that forbade political contributions by the police. 90 The court found
that public employees, especially police officers, may be restricted much
more severely than the general public because police officers must avoid
even the appearance of impropriety.' 9 ' In Otten v. Schicker'92 the
181. Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 248; see also Stradley v. Andersen, 478 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1973) (upholding groom-
ing restrictions for policemen); Yarbrough v. City of Jacksonville, 363 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Fla.
1973) (upholding beard and hair length restrictions for firefighters because hair might interfere
with the safe wearing of oxygen masks), aff'd mem., 504 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1974).
183. 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975).
184. Grusendorf, 816 F.2d at 541.
185. Hander, 519 F.2d at 275.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 276-77.
188. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973) (restricting political activities for a wide variety of federal employees). But see
Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (finding the
discharge of a teacher for publishing a letter criticizing the School Board unconstitutional).
189. 733 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Pollard v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 665 S.W.2d
333 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (holding a similar firing for political contribution consistent with the first
amendment).
190. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 545.
191. The court stated that "[i]t is proper for'a state to insist that the police be. and appear
to be, above reproach, like Caesar's wife." Id. at 547.
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Eighth Circuit found that a police officer could not become a candidate
for the state senate. In these cases the state could condition public em-
ployment on the employee giving up even the fundamental, specifically
listed first amendment right of political expression.193
The state as an employer has met with mixed judicial response for
attempts to regulate the off-duty sexual conduct of public employees."'
Police departments generally cannot regulate off-duty conduct unless
the conduct can be shown to have a connection with the officer's duties
and performance. In Shuman v. City of Philadelphia9 5 the court found
that inquiry into, and subsequent discharge based on, a police officer's
living with an unmarried woman violated his right of privacy. The right
in Shuman was not fundamental, but was private simply because it was
an area where the government had no legitimate interest.9 6 The court
conceded that the state could regulate some off-duty sexual activity,
but held that the activity at issue had too tenuous a connection with
job performance to justify the interference with privacy.1 97 Likewise,
the Ninth Circuit in Thorne v. City of El Segundo'98 found that a po-
lice department could not refuse to hire a qualified officer because she
had aborted a child whose father was a married police officer. 99
Some restrictions on off-duty sexual conduct have been upheld,
however, when the conduct interfered with the employee's job perform-
ance. The Fifth Circuit in Shawgo v. Spradlin200 found that a police
department could constitutionally institute disciplinary procedures
against two police officers who dated off duty and were shown to have
spent several nights together. 20 1 The court found that the off-duty sex-
192. 655 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1981).
193. The Reeder court stated:
People who become public employees receive certain benefits and undertake certain duties.
One of those duties may require the surrender of rights that would otherwise be beyond the
reach of governmental power. This is especially true in the case of the police, whose duty it is
to keep the peace by force of arms if necessary.
Reeder, 733 F.2d at 547.
194. See generally Note, supra note 133.
195. 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
196. Id. at 458-59.
197. Id. at 459. The court suggested that the kinds of activity which could be regulated in-
cluded those that were "open and notorious," or took place in a small town. Id.
198. 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983).
199. Id. at 462; see also Battle v. Mulholland, 439 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1971) (prohibiting the
dism;zol of a black police ofliror who had allowe'l two white single women to bo;',-d w:;h him and
his wife); Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58 (D. Md. 1970) (holding that a police department
could not refuse to hire a nudist).
200. 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983).
201. The officers in Shawgo were disciplined under a regulation forbidding members of the
department from engaging in conduct that "if brought to the attention of the public, could result
in justified unfavorable criticism of that member of the department" and ai.o under catchall provi-
sions requiring "diligent and competent" adherence to duties not "otherwise specifically pre-
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ual conduct of police officers could be regulated if a rational basis for
the restriction existed. 02 The court asserted that a rational connection
between departmental discipline and preventing cohabitation between
officers of different rank did exist.203 Likewise, in In re Raynes204 the
Montana Supreme Court held that a police department could constitu-
tionally terminate an officer who had used his hypnosis business to ma-
nipulate several women into having sex, because the state's compelling
interest in protecting both the public and the integrity of the police
department outweighed the officer's right of privacy. Similarly, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Pettit v. State Board of Education0 5 found
that the state could discharge an elementary school teacher who had
participated in a "swinger's club" and appeared disguised on a televi-
sion talk show to discuss the experience.
4. Status Crimes
Another line of cases, though decided under the eighth amendment
and thus not expressly applicable to substantive due process analysis,
also is helpful in analyzing the smoking prohibition on public employ-
ees. In the seminal case on status crimes, Robinson v. California,0 8 the
Supreme Court invalidated a California statute imposing jail time for
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics. ' 207 The Court
scribed" and prohibiting "conduct prejudicial to good order." Id. at 473 & n.1. No prior incident of
intraforce dating or cohabitation had been punished under the regulation. Id. at 473. The two
officers were different in rank, but did not work directly together. Id. at 472. They had informed a
superior officer of their relationship and had been informed that "spending the night together" was
acceptable, but "setting up housekeeping" was not. Although the two maintained separate resi-
dences, undercover surveillance from an apartment across the street lasting 17 days revealed that
they had spent several nights together. Id. The court rejected the argument that this undercover
surveillance violated plaintiffs' right to privacy: "police officers enjoy no constitutionally protected
right to privacy against undercover and other investigations of their violations of department regu-
lations or . . . law." Id. at 483. The two officers later left the department and were married.
Shawgo, 464 U.S. at 966 n.2, 968 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202. The Fifth Circuit first rejected the argument that the officers had not received fair no-
tice or hearing before disciplinary action was taken. Shawgo, 701 F.2d at 474-81.
203. Id. at 483. But see Shawgo, 464 U.S. at 971-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice William
Brennan argued that the behavior in Shawgo was a constitutionally protected fundamental privacy
right that could not be restricted absent "strong, clearly articulated state interests." Id. at 971. He
rejected the Fifth Circuit's "hypothesized" legitimate state interest, although he recognized that
"[p]ublic employers in general, and police departments in particular, may well deserve considera-
ble latitude in enforcing codes of conduct." Id. at 972.
204. 215 Mont. 484, 698 P.2d 856 (1985).
205. 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973) (en banc).
206. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
207. Id. at 660 n.1. The defendant in Robinson was arrested by an officer who observed injec-
tion marks and scabs on his inner arm. Although the defendant allegedly admitted occasional past
use of narcotics, he was "neither under the influence of narcotics nor suffering withdrawal symp-
toms" when arrested. Id. at 661-62. The defendant later denied that he had ever used drugs or
been an addict. Id.
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found that because addiction was a disease over which the addict had
little or no control, the imposition of criminal penalties merely for the
status or condition of being an addict violated the eighth amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.2 0 8 Addiction to nico-
tine now is recognized as a serious and uncontrollable condition analo-
gous to addiction to narcotics; 09 indeed, the Robinson Court stated that
the first step toward narcotics addiction may be as innocent as a boy's
first puff on a cigarette. 10 It is certainly arguable by analogy that the
state should not fire a public employee simply because that employee
develops a disease beyond his control, especially if that disease does not
prevent the employee from performing his or her duties. On the other
hand, regardless of whether criminal sanctions for addictions are imper-
missible punishments for status crimes, the state most definitely would
not be required to continue to employ a crack addict who has become
unable to perform his designated duties. In the same manner, the state
could not impose criminal sanctions for the disease of being addicted to
cigarettes, but could impose criminal penalties for the act of smoking
where prohibited.21' The state could argue that the physiological effects
of an active addiction to nicotine might make the public employee una-
ble to perform his duties effectively.
5. Possible Challenges
The cases discussed above clarify what Grusendorf suggested: a
successful privacy or liberty due process challenge to a state restriction
of the off-duty smoking of state employees is unlikely. If the state can
regulate fundamental rights like political activity, it can easily interfere
with the nonfundamental liberty to smoke in private. Some possible
challenges, however, do exist.
Perhaps the best argument for a challenge to the Massachusetts
208. The Court stated:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt to make it a crimi-
nal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal
disease ...
We cannot but consider the statute before us as of the same category. . . . [N]arcotic
addiction is an illness. Indeed, it is apparently an illness which may be contracted innocently
or involuntarily. We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a crimi-
nal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of
any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment .... Even one day in
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a common cold.
Id. at 666-67.
209. See NICOTINE ADDi'rIoN, supra note 22, at 4.
210. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring).
211. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (holding that although criminal penalties for
the state of alcoholism are inappropriate, the state may punish an offender for the act of public
drunkenness).
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statute is based on the difference between smoking in public and smok-
ing in the privacy of the employee's home.212 The plaintiff in
Grusendorf was terminated for smoking in a public restaurant on his
lunch break and presumably while he was in uniform, even though he
was off duty at the time.21 Dicta in Kelley suggested that a police pro-
hibition on smoking in public while in uniform was justified for the
same reasons as the hair length restriction: fostering respect for the po-
lice and esprit de corps.2 1 These rationales are not implicated by smok-
ing at home. Smoking in public may injure innocent bystanders,2 5 but
smoking at home is legal conduct that injures only the smoker. The
same reasons do not rationally support a restriction that applies to
smoking where no members of the public are exposed to the conduct
and its dangers. A plaintiff challenging the restriction could contend
that, like restricting private sexual activities, 216 restricting smoking
within the home bears no rational relation to the performance of the
officer's duties and invades his rights of liberty and privacy.
This argument could be countered, however, by the fact that smok-
ing within the privacy of the home would still impair the physical fit-
ness of the smoker appreciably.2 17 The state has a strong interest in the
fitness of public safety employees to ensure their competence at the
dangerous jobs they perform. It tests them before hiring and requires
them to maintain a certain level of fitness to remain employed. This
interest probably would provide a rational basis for a smoking prohibi-
tion which, as the Grusendorf court states, "burdens [employees] after
their shift has ended, restricts them on weekends and vacations, in their
automobiles and backyards and even, with the doors closed and the
shades drawn, in the private sanctuary of their own homes."21 8 The
state interest in physical fitness does not, however, extend beyond pub-
lic safety employees, and any statute that extends the smoking prohibi-
tion beyond these employees might be challenged successfully on the
distinction between public and private smoking. The physical fitness
rationale for a restriction on public safety employees also might, how-
ever, be extended to absurdity; as one disgruntled smoker stated, beer
drinking or eating eggs could be banned because of the health risk in-
volved in those activities.21 9 Furthermore, the state might move beyond
212. See Rothstein, supra note 16, at 955.
213. Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
214. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 246 (1976).
215. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 194-205 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
218. Grusendorf, 816 F.2d at 541.
219. WHERE THERE'S SMoKE, supra note 14, at 28 (quoting a disgruntled smoker who quit the
Holden, Mass. police department when a municipal policy that preceded the state-wide ban was
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banning conduct and begin to compel conduct designed to increase
health and fitness, such as an affirmative regulation that employees ex-
ercise regularly.
Another possible challenge to the Massachusetts statute might
arise in the discharge of an officer, hired after the restriction, who later
began to smoke. The smoking ban in Grusendorf applied only to train-
ees whose property interest in keeping their jobs was not sufficient to
support a claim for deprivation of property without due process.220 A
smoker fired after becoming a regular employee of long-standing in the
department has a much stronger claim under the fourteenth amend-
ment property interest analysis than the trainee in Grusendorf.
Finally, a plaintiff challenging the Massachusetts statute or a simi-
lar statute might argue that the stated purpose of the legislation, to
achieve a bargaining goal with a union that would retain the presump-
tion that respiratory disorders are job-related while minimizing the
payment of benefits to smokers whose injuries were not caused by their
jobs,221 was not rationally related to the broadness of the off-duty
smoking restriction. The purpose of the antismoking statute might be
served with much less intrusion into the private lives of state employees
by simply amending the presumption statute to eliminate the benefit of
the presumption in cases of respiratory disease in smokers.
One argument not raised by the state in Grusendorf that may pre-
clude due process challenges rests on the rule that public employment
may not be conditioned on the restriction or invasion of constitutional
liberties that could not be abridged by direct state action.222 The state
banned alcohol for the general public during the Prohibition years and
it now outlaws the use of illegal substances such as marijuana. The
proven health hazards for smokers and those exposed to smoke would
provide a rational public health justification for banning the use of to-
bacco for the general public, especially because the right to smoke prob-
ably is not fundamental. If the state could ban smoking by direct
action, presumably it could also condition public employment on em-
ployees giving up their freedom to smoke.223
B. Equal Protection
The court in Grusendorf stated that the only aspect of the off-duty
smoking prohibition that was not entirely rational was the fact that it
announced).
220. Grusendorf, 816 F.2d at 540 n.1.
221. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
223. Cf. Classen, supra note 133, at 853.
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applied only to trainee firefighters and not to the established members
of the force, who presumably were equally susceptible to the dangers of
smoking and whose need for physical fitness was as great. The court
declined to consider this equal protection problem, however, as it was
not briefed or argued.224 A challenge to the Massachusetts statute could
make a similar equal protection argument. The statute applies only to
public safety employees hired after the institution of the ban, although
again the link between smoking, health, fitness, and job-related disabil-
ity benefits is presumably just as strong for previously hired smokers.
Newly hired smokers are not a protected class for the purposes of equal
protection, so any inequality of treatment by the law is reviewed under
the rational basis test, rather than heightened scrutiny.225 It is uncer-
tain, however, whether a collective bargaining agreement will constitute
a rational basis. The health and fitness justifications do not seem to
provide reasonable justification for the unequal treatment of the law.
The court in Rossie v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue 226 re-
jected an equal protection argument based on the different treatment of
smokers in public buildings and smokers elsewhere.227 A rational basis
for the inequality existed because nonsmokers could not avoid smoke in
public buildings, but easily could avoid those places where smoking was
permitted. This justification will not support the unequal treatment in
the off-duty smoking ban, as it prohibits smoking everywhere and does
not exist to protect nonsmokers, but rather to benefit the employees
themselves.
VI. NONCONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
A. Handicap Discrimination
Both federal2 28 and state laws prohibit discrimination against
handicapped employees. Although sensitivity to smoke has been ac-
cepted by some courts as a handicap under these laws, 22 no smoker has
yet argued that the addiction to cigarettes also constitutes a protected
handicap. The 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act specifically
224. Grusendorf, 816 F.2d at 543. At oral argument counsel alluded to a collective bargaining
agreement that apparently precluded the application of the smoking ban to union employees. Id.
at 543 n.4.
225. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (applying a rational basis test to an
equal protection issue); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959).
226. 133 Wis. 2d 341, 395 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1986).
227. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
228. The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
229. See Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (holding that an
employee who was "hypersensitive" to tobacco smoke was handicapped under the Federal Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973).
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exclude alcoholics and drug abusers whose use of these substances is a
threat to the property or safety of others from the definition of handi-
capped persons. °30 A successful challenge to a smoking restriction under
the handicap discrimination laws must prove that nicotine addiction is
not drug abuse under this statute. The effect of the 1988 Surgeon Gen-
eral's Report on nicotine addiction, which found scientific evidence that
tobacco is as addictive as most illegal drugs,2 31 is uncertain. Although
the Report reinforces the conclusion that nicotine is indeed a drug
whose abuse is not a handicap under the statute, it also provides a com-
pelling argument that addiction to nicotine may impair major life activ-
ities and constitute a real, if not statutory, handicap.
B. Title VII, Civil Rights, and Employment Discrimination
Statistical studies of smokers show that more blacks and Hispanics
smoke than whites,232 more older people smoke than younger, and more
men than women smoke.2 33 A public employer's refusal to hire smokers
could lead to disparate impact on these groups, which could constitute
illegal employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.234 No challenge to an antismoking prohibition using this
argument has yet been filed. The Supreme Court has, however, rejected
the use of statistical evidence to prove the disparate impact of a public
employer's policy of refusing to hire methadone users.3 The Court re-jected statistical evidence that eighty-one percent of the employees sus-
pected of violating the drug policy were black or Hispanic and that
approximately sixty-three percent of those receiving methadone main-
tenance in public programs in New York were black or Hispanic, find-
230. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). For a thorough discussion of the handicap discrimination
statutes and their application to both public and private employees, see Fox, supra note 5, at 318-
21; Paolella, The Legal Rights of Nonsmokers in the Workplace, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 591,
615-23 (1987); and Rothstein, supra note 16, at 956-57.
231. See NICOTINE ADDICTION, supra note 22, at 4.
232. See WHERE THERE'S SMoKE, supra note 14, at 8 (noting that 47.7% of black men
smoked in 1980, compared with 40.2% of white men); Rothstein, supra note 16, at 958.
233. See WHERE THERE'S SMOKE, supra note 14, at 8 (reporting that 33% of men and 28% of
women smoke).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (establish-
ing the disparate impact argument). But see Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 777
(1989) (finding that proof of discriminatory intent must be proven in a disparate impact case in-
volving a seniority system). For a full discussion of this argument, see Fox, supra note 5, at 324-26;
and Rothstein, supra note 16, at 957-58.
235. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). Methadone treatment is
used as a cure for heroin addiction. Methadone substitutes for heroin, but "does not produce eu-
phoria or any pleasurable effects associated with heroin; on the contrary, it prevents users from
experiencing those effects when they inject heroin, and also alleviates the severe and prolonged
discomfort otherwise associated with an addict's discontinuance of the use of heroin." Id. at 573-
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ing that the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact leading to racial discrimination. " 6
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO ENFORCEMENT
Perhaps the greatest difficulty raised by the Massachusetts statute
is the question of enforcing its provisions. The statute itself specifies no
means to enforce the antismoking rule. The State is leaving enforce-
ment up to local authorities.231
Viable means of enforcing the law include relying on reports of
other employees who catch smokers, forcing suspected smokers to turn
themselves in, or testing the urine of suspected smokers for traces of
tobacco use. 3 s The first method was used in Grusendorf to catch the
trainee who smoked. When a city employee reported to the fire chief
that he had observed one trainee smoking, the chief questioned all the
trainees and threatened to discharge them unless the smoker was iden-
tified. Grusendorf then turned himself in.2"9 This method is constitu-
tional, provided the requirements of procedural due process for a
hearing are followed. It is not, however, consistently reliable or effec-
tive, and the number of employees who will report on the off-duty ac-
tivities of their fellow employees probably is limited.
The second method of enforcement, forcing self-admission, proba-
bly also is constitutional, although it raises questions under the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court, in a case that governs the application of this statute,
has found that requiring police officers to answer questions that might
lead to loss of employment will not violate the fifth amendment. In
Broderick v. Police Commissioner40 the officers had attended a politi-
cal rally and parade, at which they had roamed nude through their ho-
tel and had been loud and obnoxious. 241 The police chief, hearing
rumors of the debauchery, had distributed a questionnaire to the cul-
prits. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Gardner v.
Broderick,42 that held that a policeman may be required to answer
236. Id. at 584-87.
237. A State Representative who was a leading supporter of the bill stated "[t]he interest
here is not to be big brother .... [W]e mean[] business on this thing." Gold, supra note 13
(quoting State Rep. Kevin P. Blanchette). The Executive Director of the Massachusetts ACLU
expressed doubts about the law's enforceability. Id.
238. Professor Mark Rothstein suggests that monitoring health insurance claims and ad-
ministering polygraphs might also be used to enforce an antismoking policy. Rothstein, supra note
16, at 961-62.
239. Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539, 540 (10th Cir. 1987).
240. 368 Mass. 33, 330 N.E.2d 199, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1975).
241. Id. at 34-35, 330 N.E.2d at 201.
242. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
524 [Vol. 43:491
SMOKING BAN
questions which specifically, directly, and narrowly relate to the per-
formance of duties. '3 The Broderick court found that the range of per-
missible questions was not limited to actions that occurred while an
officer was on duty, but extended to off-duty and purely private activi-
ties if answers to such questions would unqualifiedly be grounds for ter-
mination, or would authorize other disciplinary action.244 A permissible
inquiry into private conduct must be rationally related to the perform-
ance of police duties. 4 5 As private smoking is already forbidden by stat-
ute, a direct question to a suspected smoker that would lead to
dismissal is a constitutional means of enforcing the statute. This
method provides the least intrusion of privacy and disruption of em-
ployee relations. The accuracy and effectiveness of the method, how-
ever, could be affected by untruthful employees.
The third method of enforcing the proscription, urine tests, is un-
doubtedly the most accurate means,246 but also raises the most troub-
ling constitutional implications.4 7 The fourth amendment protects
citizens against unreasonable search and seizure, and urine testing for
illegal drugs has been held to be a search for fourth amendment pur-
poses.24 8 Public employees are protected by the fourth amendment
against unreasonable searches even when the government is searching
in its capacity as employer. 24 "9 No court has decided the question of the
constitutionality of a urine test for the legal substance tobacco. The Su-
preme Court recently, however, has permitted uniform testing for illegal
drugs without probable cause or individualized suspicion for some types
of public employees. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab'50 the Court allowed mass testing of customs employees who
sought promotions to jobs that required them to carry firearms or par-
ticipate directly in drug interdiction efforts. The Court reasoned that
the compelling governmental interest in the fitness and integrity of
drug enforcement personnel and in protecting the public from drug
243. Id. at 278.
244. Broderick, 368 Mass. at 41, 330 N.E.2d at 204-05.
245. Id. at 42-43, 330 N.E.2d at 205.
246. Accurate urine tests for traces of tobacco components exist and cost approximately $25
per test. See Rothstein, supra note 16, at 962 n.181. Some private companies are reportedly al-
ready using such tests to screen out smokers. Id. at 962.
247. See generally Note, Drug Testing of Government Employees and the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Need for a Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1063 (1987); Note,
"Jar Wars" in the Workplace: The Constitutionality of Urinalysis Programs Designed to Elimi-
nate Substance Abuse Among Federal Employees, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 937 (1987).
248. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412-13 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390 (1989).
249. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1390; O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality
opinion).
250. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1394-96.
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users with firearms outweighed the diminished privacy interests of the
employees, considering the special demands of their positions.251
Although the Court's response to random testing of the general
mass of public employees remains unclear,252 the Von Raab reasoning
probably will extend to random testing of the types of public safety
employees covered by the Massachusetts smoking ban. Indeed, the
Court has recently denied certiorari to two cases addressing the issue of
random drug testing of police officers. The First Circuit, in Guiney v.
Roache,253 and the Third Circuit, in Policeman's Benevolent Associa-
tion of New Jersey, Local 318 v. Township of Washington,254 both al-
lowed the random testing of officers without individualized suspicion
for illegal substances.
Two issues on the legality of urine testing for tobacco remain. First,
the Court's position on testing public employees who are not in posi-
tions concerned with public safety is uncertain. Second, the essential
distinction remains that tobacco is a completely legal substance. Thus,
a testing program based on a reasonable suspicion of smoking might
meet with acceptance by courts, but the intrusiveness of the search and
the relative innocence of tobacco in comparison with illegal drugs still
raises serious fourth amendment questions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An off-duty smoking ban for public safety employees, although in-
trusive, is probably rationally based on the need for physical fitness and
thus constitutional. An extension of this ban to other public employees,
however, is vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. The greatest diffi-
251. Id. at 1392-95. The Court stated:
We think Customs employees who are directly involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or
who are required to carry firearms in the line of duty. . . have a diminished expectation of
privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test. Unlike most private citizens
and government employees in general, [these] employees. . . reasonably should expect effec-
tive inquiry into their fitness and probity . . . . Because successful performance of their du-
ties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity, these employees cannot reasonably
expect to keep from the Service personal information that bears directly on their fitness.
While reasonable tests designed to elicit this information doubtless infringe some privacy ex-
pectations, we do not believe these expectations outweigh the Government's compelling inter-
ests in safety and in the integrity of our borders.
Id. at 1394 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1402 (holding that
blood and urine testing for railroad employees involved in accidents was reasonable without proba-
ble cause or individualized suspicion).
252. See supra note 251 (emphasized language).
253. 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 404 (1989). The named plaintiff, react-
ing to the denial of certiorari, commented: "[P]olice officers . . . have different constitutional
rights than other citizens." Random Drug Tests for Police Allowed, Tennessean, Nov. 14, 1989, at
6A (quoting Robert Guiney, President, Boston Police Patrolman's Association).
254. 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).
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culty with the current antismoking regulation lies in the possible means
of enforcement, which are either inaccurate and inefficient or greatly
intrusive and subject to constitutional challenge.
Elizabeth B. Thompson

